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In the Introduction to The Concept of Dread, Kierkegaard’s pseudonym 
Vigilius Haufniensis points out »the fact that science, fully as much as 
poetry and art, assumes a mood both on the part of the producer and on 
the part of the recipient, that an error in modulation is just as disturbing 
as an error in the exposition of thought.«!
This observation might well be worth taking seriously when one treats 
the importance of the first article of the Creed (»1 believe in God the 
Father Almighty, maker of heaven and earth«) in Kierkegaard’s writings. 
Indeed we can find such a mood-setting quotation in Kierkegaard’s writings.
The first of the Three Edifying Discourses (1844) contains an exposition 
of the text from Ecclesiastes: »Remember now thy Creator in the days of 
thy youth.« (Eccl. 12:1).
»And in youth one does it most naturally; for a man thinks most naturally 
who can think this thought in conjunction with all the other things he thinks; 
and he thinks it most naturally who does not himself have to be changed 
in order to think it, and who does not need to have the thought changed 
in order to think it, because in the thought he finds the childlike simplicity 
which makes the game the best ... He understands immediately that a God 
exists, for to the young, God’s house lies next door to his father’s yard, and 
it seems quite natural to him to be there ... To youth God dwells close at 
hand; in the midst of sorrow and joy he hears God’s voice calling ...
Youth understands at once that God is the Creator, that He has created 
»the heavens and the earth, and all that is in them.« »All that is in them«
----is not this a great word, is it suitable for young people? What has youth
really seen? It has merely glanced at the world. What does it understand 
about the world in comparison with one who has circumnavigated the globe? 
But youth understands about God, and since He is never far away, if one 
is to find Him he should not look for Him far away ...
But as the youth quite naturally thinks that God is the Creator, so he 
just as naturally thinks what follows from that ... And what is this except 
thanksgiving in quiet humility, confidence resting in a childlike intimacy, 
the pain over the interruption of the harmony so deep that peace cannot 
long remain away, the concern so childlike that youth does not need to go 
far in order again to live and move and have his being in God.
Kierkegaard concludes his exposition by calling the youth’s remembrance 
of the Creator »the angel of salvation of the retreat« sent by heaven to the 
grown man.
»For the thought of youth about the Creator is a rosebud that does not 
wither, because it knows neither times nor seasons, and it is the child’s 
most beautiful ornament, the bride’s most glorious adornment, and the best 
raiment for the dying.«2
These excerpts from the exposition of Ecclesiastes’ exhortation to remem­
ber the Creator may more likely be true of the child’s than of the adult’s 
faith in God, a possibility of which Kierkegaard was certainly aware. The 
passage cited will, in any case, arouse astonishment when taken in connection 
with statements to the effect that Kierkegaard, for a variety of reasons, is 
incapable of giving expression to a creation-centered Christian faith. A few 
examples of this kind of critical estimation of Kierkegaard will be sufficient.
Wilhelm Anz concludes his book, Kierkegaard und der deutsche Idealis- 
mus (»Kierkegaard and German Idealism,« 1956), with the verdict that 
the theological view of the creation is missing in Kierkegaard.3
K. E. Løgstrup agrees with Anz’s criticism especially in his book, Opgør 
med Kierkegaard (»A Reckoning with Kierkegaard,« 1968). He maintains 
for example that for Kierkegaard, actual, temporal, earthly life has nothing 
to do with eternity. 4
Gustaf Wingren follows Løgstrup in his view of Kierkegaard but goes 
further than his teacher in the severity of his critical estimation: »It is not 
an exaggeration to maintain,« Wingren writes in his work, Credo, (1975) 
»that Kierkegaard hated creation-centered faith in its Old Testament, Early 
Church and Reformation form. The difficulties in understanding creation- 
centered faith ever since its emergence in European theology of the 1920’s 
derive essentially from only one person —  Kierkegaard.«^
In his Edifying Discourses Kierkegaard has deliberately chosen texts from 
the Old as well as the New Testament that reflect the concept of a creation-
centered faith. The fact that he has written no less than 12 times on Jesus’ 
parable of the lilies of the field and the birds of the air shows that at least 
he did not hate biblical, creation-centered faith. It is of course another 
question whether he has been able to deliver the essence of the biblical mes­
sage about the God of creation in a comprehensive, undistorted way. In rela­
tion to Wingren’s second assertion about Kierkegaard (that he is the source 
of the difficulties in understanding creation-centered faith), it must be 
asked whether it is Kierkegaard himself, or a one-sided---- perhaps in­
tentionally warped---- interpretation of his writings that has fostered such
a view.
Respecting Logstrup’s reckoning with Kierkegaard which had been be­
gun in several earlier works, one cannot escape the impression that Kierke­
gaard-derivatives, rather than Kierkegaard himself, have challenged him to 
make objections. As regards Wilhelm Anz, he has changed his position in 
fundamental ways since 1956, which was made evident by his lecture at the 
symposium on »Kierkegaard and German Philosophy« in Copenhagen in 
November 1979. Yet, there is reason to continue to examine his work of 
1956.
It is remarkable that neither Anz nor Logstrup, in their interpretations 
of Kierkegaard’s writings, has paid due consideration to the edifying or 
»upbuilding« works. In this connection it should be borne in mind what 
Kierkegaard writes in the draft of one of his proposed lectures on »The 
Dialectic of Ethical and Ethical-Religious Communication.« ( 1847 ).
»Especially in the communication of ethical truth and partially in the 
communication of ethical-religious truth, the indirect method is the most 
rigorous form. Yet a more direct form which runs parallel to this can also 
be necessary in order to support that by which in another sense it is itself 
supported. This I have understood right from the beginning of my activity 
as an author. Therefore along with the pseudonymous there always was 
direct communication in the guise of the edifying or upbuilding discourses, 
and the last few years I have used direct communication almost exclusively. «6
According to Kierkegaard’s own opinion, the edifying and the pseudony­
mous writings support each other, and consequently it is also necessary 
to let them interpret each other if one wishes to do justice to his intentions 
and discover his real meaning.
For Kierkegaard, creation-centered faith has least of all to do with the
attempts to prove God’s existence and their rather questionable results. He 
never tires of speaking ironically of such attempts to produce reliable and 
convincing proofs of God’s existence. These attempts, he says, only mean 
that God must sit in Heaven waiting for it to be decided whether he exists 
at all, and so he finally comes into existence with the help of some proofs. 7 
»For to prove the existence of one who is present is the most shameless 
affront, since it is an attempt to make him ridiculous; but unfortunately 
people have no inkling of this and for sheer seriousness regard it as a pious 
undertaking. But how could it occur to anybody to prove that he exists, 
unless one had permitted oneself to ignore him before,« as Kierkegaard 
has it in his Concluding Unscientific Postscript. To make the God-idea crown 
the proud edifice of »the system« in which the whole complexity of existence 
is explained means that God is made into a mere product of thought and 
laced up in the system’s straitjacket. »It must be the very devil to be 
God in that manner,« adds Climacus.8
If the doctrine of the God of creation becomes an expression of worship,
----as a prayer or a hymn of praise----- one must acknowledge that it has
a predominant place in Kierkegaard’s writings. In his own words, it express­
es both fear and bliss,---- fear of not being able to act without being in
God, and bliss in the conviction that God is always near one who calls 
for His help.9
The first article of the Creed expresses three essential tenets which dis­
tinguish the Christian belief in God; 1) God is the creator of Heaven and 
Earth, 2) He is almighty, 3) He takes fatherly and loving care of his 
creation. In Kierkegaard’s writings his references to God as the Father 
Almighty, the Supreme Lord, are probably the most conspicuous and striking 
feature. But the idea of God the Creator who takes constant and fatherly 
care of his creation is indissolubly connected with the idea of omnipotence.
In The Gospel of Suffering (1847) Kierkegaard writes, »But what indeed 
is all eternal truth other than this: that God rules? And what is obedience 
except this: letting God rule? And what other connection and agreement is 
indeed possible between the temporal and the eternal than: that God rules 
and allowing God to rule!«10
This compact formula with its central content is expounded by Kierke­
gaard in a variety of ways. At the basis of the idea of omnipotence are 
statements regarding God’s creation out of nothing. »For God who creates
out of nothing, who almightily takes from nothing says, »Let there be.«H 
And as everything has come into existence through Gods’ omnipotence, it 
is the same power that continues to maintain and to bear the whole of 
existence. If, for a single instant, the world were to be without God, it 
would be reduced to nothing again. 12
In his kingdom of infinite space the Creator sustains the stars and at 
the same time, with fatherly care, concerns himself with the sparrow. 13 The 
whole creation bears witness to his omnipotence. He is present also in the 
world of events, in the slightest occurrence as well as in the greatest. Invis­
ible, he has put on the visible world like a garment. H
Because, although hidden, the Almighty is omnipresent, the fundamental 
conditions of human life are determined by the fact that, every moment, 
man exists in the presence of God. He has been created out of nothing, so 
»he belongs to God as a bondservant, and in such a way as no bondservant 
has ever belonged to an earthly master, who nevertheless concedes that 
thoughts and feelings are free. But he belongs to God in every thought, 
the most hidden, in every feeling, the most private, in every motion, the 
most inward.«!5 Consequently, the highest state a man can attain is not 
to be free and independent but to be capable of being an instrument in 
the hands of Governance. 16
As Kierkegaard’s emphasis on the omnipotent sovereignty of God in 
relation to man is one of the most prominent features in his writings, it 
would be strange if this contention were not clearly shown in his essential 
description of man. In his anthropological thinking, however, Kierkegaard
uses for the most part the same terminology as German idealism---- in
spite of his increasingly intense struggle against this movement. The question 
whether he was able to avoid being fundamentally influenced has long been 
the subject of debate. Wilhelm Anz, in his work cited above, maintains 
that Kierkegaard, in spite of his vigorous protest against Hegel’s philosophy, 
shows a fundamental conformity with Hegel’s idealistic thinking in his 
conception of the spirit which results from existential dialectics. In Kierke­
gaard the ontological sovereignty of the subjective view prevails over objec­
tive religious truth, according to Anz. A human spirit as a synthesis of
the finite and the infinite knows only the reality built up by itself----self-
created truth. This is the reason why the theological view of creation-centered 
faith is missing in Kierkegaard, and therefore the accomplished synthesis
between the finite and the infinite leads to the annihilation of the finite. 17
First a few words concerning Anz’s criticism when it is taken to mean 
that the Creator’s sovereignty is dethroned by man’s sovereignty as a spirit 
and a self. In The Sickness Unto Death (1849), Kierkegaard’s anthropolog­
ical definitions reach their greatest precision. In this book man is seen as 
a synthesis of the infinite and the finite, of things temporal and eternal, 
of possibility and necessity. But the relation between the conditions which 
make up the synthesis and which is inherently present, does not yet constitute 
man as a self. Not until this combination of opposites is related to an ideal 
relation can one speak about the self as a positive third condition. As this 
is also expressed in the formula, »the self relates itself to itself,« it becomes 
clear that, on the one hand, the self stands for the ideal or absolute relation, 
and on the other for man as standing in relation to it. When the self is 
related to the absolute self, it thereby is related to the power that has 
»established« it. In other words, through this relation man finds his relation 
to God. Despair, the sickness unto death, arises out of the inevitable relation 
of the self to its Creator and results when this relation is out of order. If 
a man is not conscious of himself as spirit and self, he cannot be helped 
out of his despair. For he can as little free himself from the God-relation 
as he can get rid of God’s »co-knowing« with him in the relation of con­
science.!^ The formula in The Sickness Unto Death which defines faith —
the state in which there is no despair at a l l ---- is expressed as follows:
»in relating itself to itself and in willing to be itself, the self rests transpa­
rently in the power that established it.«19 That man becomes transparent 
before God as the basis of his life means that he is conscious of his relation 
to God and does not try to conceal this from himself or to hide from God’s 
presence. As a synthesis of spirit and sjcel, man is by no means master of his 
situation or of absolute truth. Instead, he is inescapably bound to his Creator 
whose supreme power is the chief factor in his existence.
God created man in his own image. But God is spirit, and, as in man,
the expression of spirit is not physically visible. As far as man is spirit----
and this is his invisible g lory----he can and shall praise the Creator in
worship. »Man and God are like one another, not directly, but inversely; 
only when the infinite God has become the eternal, omnipresent object of 
worship, and man is always a worshipper, only then are they like to one 
another.« Thus Kierkegaard has it in his discourse, »How Splendid it is to
be a Man.«20 »Splendid to be clad like the lily, yet more splendid to be 
the erect sovereign, but most splendid to be nothing, in adoration!«21 This 
quotation, taken from the same discourse, with its emphasis upon »being 
nothing«, leads to the question whether man’s God-relation means that the 
finite is annihilated (Anz) or that real, temporal, earthly life has nothing 
to do with eternity (Logstrup).
The second part of Either-Or contains a section about mysticism which 
is of interest in this connection. Kierkegaard has Judge William point out 
that one can truly say that the mystic chooses himself absolutely. But he 
chooses himself in his complete isolation, since the whole world is dead 
and annihilated to him. He has fallen in love with God, but it could be 
argued that he disdains God’s love, since he disdains the reality of the 
existence to which God has assigned him. Judge William regards the life 
of a mystic as a deceit against the world in which he lives and against the 
people with whom he is connected. The Judge goes on to say that »hardly 
could a more frightful thing be conceived than that there might be a collision 
between love for God and love for the persons for whom love has been 
planted by Him in our hearts.«22
There is no reason to doubt that the proffered criticism of mysticism 
expresses Kierkegaard’s own conception. The same ideas can be found in 
other places in his writings, for example in Works of Love. In the section 
dealing with our duty to love the people we see, Kierkegaard refers to 1 
John 4:20: »for he who does not love his brother whom he has seen, can­
not love God whom he has not seen.« The apostle means, argues Kierke­
gaard, that this is a divine statement opposed to human enthusiasm which 
feels that the more one neglects the people he sees, the more he loves the 
unseen God. »But when this is the case, God is changed to an unreal some­
thing, a fancy. Such a thing can occur only to a hypocrite or to a deceiver in 
order to find an escape, or to one who misrepresents God, as if God were 
grasping for his own interest and his being loved, rather than that the holy 
God is gracious and therefore always points away from himself, saying, as 
it were, Tf you wish to love me, love the men you see. Whatever you do 
for them you do for me’ ... Christian love is not supposed to vault into 
heaven, for it comes from heaven and with heaven ... But we men talk 
about finding the perfect person in order to love him ... We men want to 
look upward in order to look for the perfect object (but the direction is
always towards the unseen), but in Christ perfection looked down to earth 
and loved the person it saw.«23
In his A Reckoning with Kierkegaard, Logstrup recurs several times to 
the assertion in Works of Love that, Christianly understood, love for one’s 
fellow man consists in helping him to love God. »All other actions seem 
to be without connection to this ethical-religious demand. Never once has 
the ethical shut itself up and kept all the world out as has happened with 
Kierkegaard.«24 With this critical interpretation of the statement there 
exists an obvious contradiction to other statements in Works of Love where 
Kierkegaard wants to show how Christian love should permeate every con­
dition of life. But this contradiction is illusory. According to Kierkegaard, 
to help one’s neighbor to love God does not mean to support him in his 
private piety, but to help him fulfil the role in life that God has given to 
him. 2 5
In his discourse on 1 Cor. 13:5, Kierkegaard develops the outlook that 
»love seeks not its own,« but what is appropriate for each individual. With
infinite love God concerns himself with all the variety of nature----even
to the point of letting a small flower become distinctive (»eiendommeligt«). 
Divine love »makes infinite distinctions in loving the differences«. Thus 
every man who has the courage to be himself also has distinctiveness (»Eien- 
dommelighed«) which he has received as a gift from the Creator. Seen in 
this way, true love loves every human being according to his or her indi­
viduality. 2 6
An additional quotation from Works of Love will not be out of place:
»People usually warn piously against wasting God’s gifts, but which of 
God’s gifts can be compared to love, which he implanted in man’s heart
----alas, and then to see it wasted in this way! The shrewd foolishly think
that one wastes his time in loving imperfect, weak men. I should think 
that this would be making use of one’s love, employing it. But to be un­
able to find an object, to waste love in vainly seeking, to waste it in empty 
space by loving the invisible---- this is truly to waste it ...
Understand that the mistake lies in your conception of love that it should 
be a demand ... that it is the very reverse of a requirement, that it is a 
credit (Tilgodehavende) to which God binds you.«27
Kierkegaard expresses his conviction that eternity has to do with earthly 
and temporal life in two of his most distinctive conceptions, namely »the
double movement of infinity« and »the repetition,«----both of which he
develops in different connections. In The Sickness Unto Death, for example, 
the meaning of the double movement can be shown in the following thought: 
»To become oneself is to become concrete. But to become concrete means 
neither to become finite nor infinite, for that which has to become concrete 
is a synthesis. Accordingly, the development consists in moving away from 
oneself infinitely by the process of infinitizing oneself, and in returning 
to oneself infinitely by the process of finitizing.«28 The examples of diff­
erent forms of despair that Kierkegaard cites show plainly what he wants 
to say by the words »to become concrete«. In the despair of infinity when 
man wishes to be wholly infinite, he becomes fantastic in his attitude. For 
instance, he may lose himself in abstract sentimentality;29 or he may acquire 
a large amount of knowledge but not advance in self-knowledge to the same 
extent; or make great decisions but let the matter rest there, so that a part 
of the task which could have been completed in the concrete situation of 
the present moment is not carried out.
In a similar way, the despair of possibility, which consists in the lack 
of necessity, may be described as the absence of strength to obey, to submit 
to the necessary in one’s self, to that which constitutes man’s limitations.
To sum up, man may be said to be in despair if he tries to break away 
from his given natural and historical situation which he cannot deal with 
after his own devices as it is enclosed by God’s commanding, creative will. 
In the same way, the despair of finiteness is described as a lack of infinity, 
as having deprived oneself of one’s primitivity, as not being oneself, but 
merely a number in a grey mass. The despair of necessity in turn, may be 
characterized as fatalism or triviality. To this despair Kierkegaard advances 
the conviction of the belief that »with God all things are possible«.
But yet one wonders whether Kierkegaard has described the first stage 
of the double movement of infinity in a way that makes man as a created 
being inferior to man as an existing, eternal and infinite, spirit with the 
power to create his own reality. This is the opinion of Wilhelm Anz as 
well as of K. E. L0gstrup.3O
Kierkegaard uses many different expressions to describe the first move­
ment of infinity. He speaks of self-annihilation, of becoming nothing, of 
man realizing that before God he is always in the wrong, of not being 
capable of accomplishing anything by oneself, of infinite resignation, of
letting the world go to ruin, of dying away from immediateness, of infinitely 
getting away from oneself by making the self infinite.
In this connection Kierkegaard’s point of departure is the Biblical belief, 
which according to him is basic, that God created man out of nothing. 31 
This is as true of man as of nature. Yet, in the world of nature everything 
is unconditional obedience, and everything is, as it were, nothing, for it 
exists by the will of God. The very instant that it might not be God’s will, 
it has ceased to exist. As far as he is spirit, man shall, in liberty and respon­
sibility, give expression to the same obedience in the understanding that 
without God’s will he is not even capable of lifting a finger.32 Man has 
been created to take everything from God’s hand in obedience to his con­
science, and so the highest perfection that he can attain is to express the 
belief that, without God, he is not able to accomplish anything. In this atti­
tude lies the bliss of faith. For the belief that man is not capable of accom­
plishing anything by himself is the negative expression for the fact that he 
is capable of everything by the help of God. 3 3 Becoming nothing does not 
mean the obliteration of the self in its distinctiveness, but rather of the 
selfishness that wants to put itself in the place of God. Nor does it mean 
that man’s actual situation is to be ignored. For the movement of infinite 
resignation is not to become man’s whole religion. This might lead to the 
knight of infinite resignation becoming lost in a kind of dreamy con­
templation of the omnipotent deity. But this would be to take God in vain, 
as Kierkegaard has it in his discourse, »Man’s Need of God Constitutes 
his Highest Perfection.«
Just as resignation must have the character of an unfinished movement 
within the double movement of infinity in order to be true, so shall man’s 
belief that he is not capable of accomplishing anything be a preparation 
for his being blessed by God with the assurance of his destiny. God does 
not want man to lounge in a kind of spiritual effeminacy in the contempla­
tion of his glory, but he wants to create a new man. For where God is truly 
present, there one always finds creativity. If a man lets God rule, the result 
is both the realization of his own God-given destiny, and a contribution to 
the realization of God’s intentions for his fellow men. When God is allowed 
to rule in a man’s life, one will discover his neighbor and one’s duty to 
love him, as Kierkegaard has it in Works of Love.%5
The category of repetition, which corresponds closely to the double
movement of infinity, has been posited by Kierkegaard as the Christian 
concept answering to the Greek notion of »recollection«. Repetition is Kierke­
gaard’s attempt to explain how man can, by freely taking responsibility for 
his life and acknowledging his guilt, can cancel the repetitive condition 
through which evil returns (i.e. sin), and can instead create the condition 
necessary for the good (i.e. faith). Man’s efforts alone, however, only lead 
him to despair over the possibility of a repetition of the good. But this 
possibility can be made actual by believing in the forgiveness of sins which 
wipes out the despair of »the old Adam« and gives birth to a willingness 
in »the new man« to let himself be created by God. Then, in this condition 
of penitence, Christ dwells in man and fights the good fight against despair 
which is not overcome once and for all. »It was Christ who came in the 
fullness of time; it was He who completed what the Father had begun, He 
who completed the creation and transformed the shape of the world,« as 
Kierkegaard writes in The Gospel of Suffering.37 The fact that Christ has 
come into the world, thereby confronting every man with the necessity 
»to have an opinion about Him,« is the conclusion that Kierkegaard draws 
in The Sickness Unto Death. 3 8
By faith, the believer is helped to become wholly contemporary with 
himself, a thought which Kierkegaard develops in one of his discourses 
on »The Anxieties of the Heathen«. (Christian Discourses, 1848)
»The believer is present ... therefore he is quit of the next day. One who 
rows a boat turns his back to the goal towards which he labours. ... When by 
the help of eternity a man lives absorbed in today, he turns his back to the 
next day. The more he is eternally absorbed in today, the more decisively 
does he turn his back upon the next day, so that he does not see it at all ... 
whereas by the help of eternity he sees quite clearly today and its task ... 
One might think that the believer would be very far from the eternal when 
he turns his back to it and lives today, while the glimpser stands and looks 
towards it. And yet it is the believer who is nearest the eternal, while the 
apocalyptic visionary is farthest from the eternal. Faith turns its back to 
the eternal in order precisely to have this with him today.«39
This examination of the place and importance of the first article of the 
Creed in Kierkegaard’s writings has not touched upon the final writings 
included in The Attack Upon »Christendom«, distinguished as they are 
by their strongly ascetic pronouncements which sound hostile to life and
creation. In my book, Efterfoljelsens teologi hos Sôren Kierkegaard, (»The 
Imitation of Christ in the Thought of Kierkegaard,« 1956), I tried to show 
that in the satiric statements which make up the attack upon »Christendom«, 
there is not only an array of conscious exaggerations and one-sided arguments, 
but also a modification in essential points in Kierkegaard’s way of thinking 
occurring over a stretch of several years. Such a change can be seen in his 
view of Christianity as a religion of hidden inwardness; in his stress upon 
self-denial as a Christian practice; in his perception of Christ as the pattern; 
and in his thoughts on individual and community life.
This change, however, does not have its source in a new conception of 
God, the father almighty, maker of heaven and earth, but, as far as it can 
be discovered, is based upon an ever more intense demand to express one’s 
following of Christ in imitation. It would be too involved, in this connection, 
to deal with the problems of Kierkegaard’s conceptions of creation and 
providence. But it is clear that only if one chooses to interpret Kierkegaard 
backwards, as it were, by viewing all of his writings in the light of the final 
period, can one put a negative or downright hostile stamp on his view of 
creation-centered faith.
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